It is common in business analyses to invoke different efficiencies generated by scale: growth is associated with declining average costs/sales and rising profit margins. Factors cited include the relatively fixed nature of some costs, increased bargaining power, and network effects. We investigate how different cost lines evolve for a sample of US firms after their IPO. To our surprise, costs/sales do not generally decline, even during the early years when growth is highest. We observe similar results for other samples of domestic and overseas firms, both public and private. We explore possible explanations for our results and discuss implications, especially for cost allocation and financial projections.
I. Introduction
Projections for growing firms routinely anticipate performance improvements because of scale economies. A text search of SEC filings, analyst reports, and articles in the business press provides thousands of instances where the terms "economies of scale", "scale economies", and often just the abbreviated "scale" describe how scale improves projected performance.
Conventional wisdom is that average cost ratios (CR = costs/sales) decline and profit margins (PM = profits/sales) increase with scale. Many reasons are offered for the "hockey stick" patterns of margin increases projected to accompany increases in scale. One driver of improved performance is operating leverage due to "fixed" costs. Even though such costs are not fixed in the long term, they are assumed to be semi-variable; i.e., they grow at a slower rate than sales. 1 Another common source is increased bargaining power, which results in lower input costs and higher output prices.
Other sources mentioned include network effects, front-loaded investments in technology and customer acquisition, and minimum scale necessary to be considered seriously by various stakeholders.
It is useful to clarify that the textbook definition of scale economies (e.g., Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005) refers to average costs per unit of output (total costs divided by output quantity), whereas popular usage refers to average costs per dollar of output (total costs divided by sales, or output quantity times price). The two measures of average cost can vary differently with scale because output prices can vary with scale. To avoid confusion, we use a different label-scale efficiencies-to represent average costs per dollar of output (CR) declining with scale. 1 There is a general sense that many costs-legal, compliance, technology, advertising-do not need to increase proportionately with sales. Another justification appears to be the declining portion of long-run average cost curves discussed in economics texts.
Our main objective is to document trends in scale efficiencies for a high-growth sample:
all US firms that have gone public since 1974 (the Ritter IPO sample). We do so because longitudinal, firm-level scale efficiencies receive little academic attention, despite their importance and widespread acceptance. 2 To illustrate how frequently scale efficiencies are invoked for IPOs, we search for the term "scale" in the registration filings and sell-side analyst reports initiating coverage for the 20 largest IPOs in 2018. Even though half these IPOs are mature firms, not recent startups, for all but two firms we find numerous references to margins improving with scale in both sets of documents.
A second motivation to study how CR declines with scale is the distortion created by organizations routinely using average (or full) costs, rather than long run marginal costs, for various decisions. For example, Noreen and Soderstrom (1994) conclude that average costs in their study overstate marginal costs on average by 40 percent (and in some departments by over 100 percent). The academic literature (e.g., Zimmerman 1979, and Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan 2002) offers various explanations for why full costing remains so prevalent.
Documenting how average costs decline with scale for different cost items provides indirect evidence on the extent and nature of distortions created by using average costs.
We track trends for CR and PM for firms in the Ritter IPO sample as they grow. We cannot regress CR or PM directly on firm scale because of endogeneity: Unexpected changes in demand, which affect growth in scale, will also be reflected in CR and PM. To control for this mechanical relation between profitability and scale, we use firm age as an instrument for scale. Firm age is 2 Jain and Kini (1994) investigate a hand-collected sample of 682 IPOs (mainly between 1980 and 1988) , and find a decline in post-issue operating performance, measured as operating profits and cash flows deflated by assets.
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The activity-based costing (ABC) literature (e.g., Cooper and Kaplan, 1988) appears to be an exception as it argues that full costs proxy well for marginal costs because costs vary proportionately with cost drivers in the long-term. As discussed in Section 2, a more careful reading of the literature suggests that it is agnostic about observed firmlevel relations between costs and sales.
plausibly exogenous and should proxy on average for expected scale in high growth samples. We confirm that sample firms grow substantially with age: median real sales growth exceeds 8 percent per year. In addition to year fixed effects, which control for economy-wide changes in cost ratios, we include firm fixed effects because of systematic variation in the cost structure of different IPO cohorts (see Section 3).
We consider four cost categories and three margin measures. The CR categories are: production costs or cost of goods sold (COGS); selling and administrative costs (SG&A); depreciation and amortization (D&A), and financing costs, represented by levels of debt plus equity used to finance net operating assets (Net OA). The PM measures are: earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), net income (NI) and economic income (EI), which equals NI less a charge for the cost of equity. We assume the cost of equity is the 10-year risk-free rate plus an equity premium of 3 percent for all sample firms (e.g., Claus and Thomas 2001). Because CR and PM are expressed as a fraction of Sales, all cost and profit measures are deflated by Sales.
We find surprising results: Contrary to our expectation and the common wisdom that scale efficiencies are pervasive, we do not observe declines in CR and increases in PM. When we allow for nonlinear variation, there is indication of an initial, small decline in SG&A, but that efficiency is offset by increases in COGS, leaving EBIT margins relatively flat over time. Perhaps more surprising, even young cohorts, experiencing the most rapid growth immediately after IPO, exhibit no margin improvements. Similar results are observed for six of seven industry sectors: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Information Technology.
Healthcare is the lone sector that exhibits margin improvements over time.
To assess the generalizability of our main finding, we repeat the analyses for three other larger samples. We investigate all US public firms (CRSP/Compustat sample), public firms around the globe (FACTSET sample), and private firms in Europe (AMADEUS sample). Again, we fail to find margin improvement trends. Note that these samples contain more mature firms, growing more slowly than our IPO sample, and the European private firms are also considerably smaller.
While a direct inference from our findings is that scale efficiencies are limited in practice, it is possible that they exist but are offset by other factors. Perhaps declining output prices offset declining unit costs, if competitors also grow. 4 Alternatively, scale efficiencies could be offset by various frictions-such as agency costs and resource constraints. 5 We partition our IPO sample at the median along factors that proxy for these offsetting effects: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for competition; the ratio of cash plus short-term investments to total assets for resource constraints (e.g., Denis and McKeon, 2018) ; and ratio of total assets/sales for agency costs (Ang et al. 2000) . We add a fourth factor-demand uncertainty, proxied by the standard deviation of sales changes-because Banker et al. (2014) conclude that firms facing high demand uncertainty select high fixed cost strategies to be able to fill demand when it is high. High fixed cost structures should be associated with higher scale efficiencies. If scale efficiencies exist but are offset by these factors on average, they should be observed for subgroups with lower offsetting effects (e.g., low competition subgroup). Again, to our surprise, none of the subgroups with lower offsetting effects, nor any of the remaining subgroups, exhibit trends consistent with scale efficiencies.
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Our persistent inability to document evidence of scale efficiencies for any of the various samples studied is at odds with the popular narrative. We rarely hear objections or caveats when performance improvements are routinely invoked for growth plans. As a result, we find that 4 Consider manufacturers of Android smartphones. Market growth and technology improvements might reduce unit costs, and yet competition likely passes those savings on to customers, leaving CR unchanged.
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CR increases with scale if agency costs, which cause managers to engage in unprofitable projects, increase over time. Resource-constrained firms pick more profitable projects first, resulting in declining PM as they grow.
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There are other potential offsetting effects that we do not investigate, because relevant data are not easily obtained. For example, scale efficiencies could be offset by diseconomies of scope, and firms might follow budgeting processes that project costs to grow in proportion to sales. students, faculty, and practitioners view our results as surprising and counterintuitive. From our perspective, the results are surprising for a different reason: How have scale efficiencies become so well-accepted, seemingly based on intuitive appeal rather than empirical support?
The first implication of our results is that scale efficiencies are not easily obtained. Rather than expect scale efficiencies to arise naturally, business analyses should incorporate them only if strong support exists. Second, finding that costs grow proportionately with sales suggests that CR and PM, which are average ratios, are reasonable proxies for their long run marginal equivalents.
If so, there is less concern about distortions created by the use of average ratios for decisions. This suggests a direct motivation to use average costs separate from the more nuanced motivations discussed in the literature (e.g., Zimmerman, 1979) . Finally, our results suggest a simple "proportional model" to calibrate long-term projections: maintaining constant ratios of different costs to sales is a reasonable first approximation. Our data confirm this implication: Predicted values for costs, based on last year's CR, are close to observed values for most firm-years. 7 We encourage more study of the metrics and comparisons we consider here because they are relevant to business decisions, perhaps more so than those studied in the vast literature on economies of scale, returns to scale, and productivity (see online appendix). We ignore physical quantities and unit costs relevant to those efficiency measures and concentrate instead on dollardenominated ratios of costs to sales. We focus on longitudinal scale variation associated with growth, whereas those studies typically examine scale variation across firms. 8 Importantly, the firm-level cost structure we investigate differs in at least two ways from subunit-level (often plant-7 For example, the mean and median of changes in COGS are both zero, and the first (third) quartile is -2.1 (+2.0) percent of observed COGS. (2014) is an important exception that tracks a number of indicators, including factor productivity and revenue product, as firms age. level) cost structures typically investigated. 9 First, many costs that are fixed at the subunit level, such as depreciation, will increase at the firm level as more plants are added when firms grow.
Second, we also study non-manufacturing and financing costs-representing about 40 percent of sales on average-that are generally excluded at the subunit level. We note that our investigation blurs any cost stickiness, and associated asymmetry, documented in the cost literature on shortterm responses to changes in demand (e.g., Anderson et al. 2003; Balakrishnan et al. 2014, Banker and Chen 2006; and Banker and Byzalov 2014) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some relevant studies from the accounting literature on cost structure. Section 3 describes our methodology, sample, and relevant statistics. Section 4 investigates how CR and PM vary as firms grow for our IPO sample.
Section 5 replicates the analyses on three broader samples that include non-US firms and private firms. Section 6 concludes.
Scale efficiencies: Reasons to expect them and empirical measures

Basis for scale efficiencies.
As mentioned in the Introduction, numerous reasons are offered for why margins should improve with scale. Operating leverage is a source cited frequently, and is often described as arising from "fixed" costs. The assumption is that many costs are semi-variable in the long term;
i.e., they vary with scale but not proportionately. These costs include capacity costs-such as production, technology, and distribution-as well as some portion of periodic costs for different functions-such as advertising, promotion, compliance, investor relations, and legal.
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Evidence obtained at the firm-level in that literature is limited and the conclusions are mixed (e.g., Basu and Fernald, 1997, and Klette, 1999) . To overcome the lack of firm-level data on prices and quantities of inputs and outputs, studies investigate plant-level data and employee-employer matched data from various national Census estimates (e.g., survey papers by Bartelsman and Doms, 2000, and Syverson, 2011). While the intuitive basis for this view is a sense that this is how such costs vary in practice, the conceptual basis appears to rest on two notions discussed in business and economics courses.
One is an intuitive extension of the fixed/variable cost dichotomy used to develop contribution margins and breakeven analyses. To be sure, this dichotomy captures short-run cost behavior, but there is a suggestion that such fixed costs are nonlinear, not fully variable, when extended to the long term. The other basis is the declining portion of long-run average cost curves discussed in economics. Long-run average unit cost curves-drawn as envelopes of local short-run curvesdecline initially with output quantity, before they reach a minimum. Operating leverage is not the only reason cited in economics texts for downward-sloping long run average cost curves, but it is an important one.
Frequent references are also made to other sources of scale efficiencies. One source is increased bargaining power with suppliers and customers: scale results in lower input costs and higher output prices. Another source is network effects, which is also described using more catchy labels, such as virtuous cycles and flywheel effects. Benefits grow nonlinearly with scale because of interactions and feedback loops across customers, products, and so on. A third reason to expect margins to increase with scale is the need, especially for so-called "new economy" firms, to make substantial investments in technology and customer acquisition before benefits are realized. It is partly a timing mismatch, created by GAAP rules that do not allow such investments to be capitalized and then expensed later when the benefits arise. Another source of scale benefits is the notion that a minimum scale is necessary for visibility and credibility. Breaking through that minimum creates new opportunities, as firms attract more serious attention from various stakeholders, such as customers, employees, and suppliers.
Notwithstanding variation in the reasons why scale efficiencies arise, there is substantial agreement that they are expected, especially for high growth firms such as startups that have recently gone public. Profit margins, which are low or even negative at IPO, should increase over time as firms grow. To illustrate the extent to which scale efficiencies are projected for this subset of firms, we searched for "scale" in the registration documents (S-1, S-11, and F-1) filed with the SEC and reports from sell-side analysts initiating coverage for the largest 20 IPOs in 2018. 10 We note that only half the IPOs are startups (e.g., Dropbox), expected to grow rapidly. The other half are mature firms: some taken public by private equity investors (e.g., ADT and BJ's Wholesale Club) and others are spinoffs from larger firms (e.g., Elanco and AXA). For all but two of the IPOs (Docusign and Gates Industrial), we find numerous references to scale efficiencies in both sets of documents. The reasons cited are covered in the paragraphs above. In some cases, the appeal to scale efficiencies is viewed as being so obvious that it needs no explanation.
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Turning from scale efficiency references in practice to those in published accounting research, we searched for the terms "economies" AND "scale" in the full text of articles on ABI Inform within scholarly journals that included "Accounting" in the publication title. The search produced about 2,000 results. This number overstates the relevant cites because scale economies are not advocated or documented in all cases; e.g., some articles simply mention it in passing.
Regardless, searching through the occurrences of those terms in a handful of articles suggests that authors expect scale efficiencies to arise naturally in the contexts they investigate. 10 https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2018/12/07/top-ipos-2018-26-biggest-companies-went-publicyear/38611947/. We selected the top 20 firms from this list, and dropped GLDM, as it is a trust designed to reflect the price of gold.
For example, the Deutsche Bank analyst report on PagSeguro states: "Furthermore, we expect EBITDA margins to improve significantly from 28% today to over 45% by 2020, as the company gains scale."
The managerial accounting literature tends to emphasize more the fixed/variable nature of costs. Given that it is not the focus of our study, we conducted only a limited search: within some papers recommended to us as being potentially relevant. Many of the discussions and investigations relate to short-term behavior, as they consider different ways to separate fixed and variable cost components. For example, in some cases fixed costs are indicated by a positive intercept or varying slopes in the relation between levels of cost and volume, and in other cases the focus is on the relation between percent changes in cost and volume (e.g., Footnote 3 in Noreen and Soderstrom, 1994) . The empirical evidence is consistent with cost functions being nonlinear, or semi-variable (e.g., Kallapur and Eldenberg, 2005, and Soderstrom, 1997) .
One notable exception to this general view that costs are nonlinear is the Activity-Based Costing (ABC) approach (e.g., Cooper and Kaplan, 1988) . Proponents of ABC suggest that costs are fully variable because there are no fixed costs in the long run, as managers can adjust the supply of resources when demand changes. ABC costing focuses on the costs of resources actually used, which is linear in the quantity of demands for those resources (activities). However, costs measured at the firm level will not vary linearly because managers do not adjust the supply of resources, in the short run, to changes in short-run demand,. As unused capacity is expensed as period costs, margins based on reported financial statements can increase with capacity utilization.
Also, ABC proponents suggest that managers often do not understand fully their cost structure because they use simple allocation schemes that distort how products, services, and customers use capacity-supplying resources (e.g., personnel and equipment). This lack of understanding leads to suboptimal decisions-such as adding marginal products and customers that that are less profitable than their analyses suggest-which reduce margins. These decisions also lead to so-called "super variable" costs (Kaplan, 2009) in which certain costs, especially SG&A, grow even faster than sales.
This conclusion-that costs need not increase proportionately with scale-is supported further when we incorporate evidence from the few empirical studies of how activity costs vary in practice. The evidence provided by ABC proponents is typically based on case studies of individual firms, where activity costs appear to vary with relevant cost drivers (e.g., Kaplan 1987).
Studies based on larger samples fail to find evidence consistent with costs varying with cost drivers. Foster and Gupta (1990) find that even though overhead costs increase linearly with volume, they do not vary with different activity drivers. Further, Soderstrom, (1994 and 1997) find that costs in their hospital setting do not vary linearly with volume.
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Overall, our understanding of the positions of managers, analysts, the business press, students, and academics is that they generally expect scale efficiencies. The ABC literature is an exception to this common wisdom. It does not have a position on scale efficiencies at the firm level, with suggestions that CR and PM could either increase or decrease with scale. That is, it does not predict that firm-level CR and PM should remain constant as firms grow over time.
Measuring cost/sale ratios (CR) and profit margins (PM)
Table 1 describes how we use financial data to estimate CR for four cost categories (see Appendix for additional details for al variables). We split operating costs into three groups: a) production costs or costs of goods sold (COGS); b) selling, general, and administrative costs (SG&A); and c) depreciation and amortization (D&A). For brevity the variable names do not emphasize deflation by Sales, as in concept CR and PM refer to ratios expressed as a fraction of Sales. We ignore non-operating costs, as they are unlikely to be associated with scale efficiencies.
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To the extent that these empirical studies are based on unit-level, rather than entity-level, data their results are less relevant to our investigation, because of our interest in firm-level variation with scale.
And we do not consider tax costs because they are a product of pre-tax income and tax rates: Pretax income is already reflected in the sum of the cost ratios mentioned above, and variation in tax rates should be unrelated to scale efficiencies.
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Costs of financing, the fourth category, include interest costs for debt financing and the required or normal profit for equity financing. We compute financing costs as the product of the required rate of return times the book value of investment for each investor type. There is considerable time-series variation in required rates of return, mainly due to variation in expected inflation. We assume that this variation is unrelated to scale efficiencies and absorb it in year fixed effects. We do not estimate asset risk and assume that it remains constant over time for each firm.
Avoiding the need to estimate required rates of return allows us to use the book value of debt plus equity to proxy for financing costs. Given that scale efficiencies are associated with operations not cash balances, we deduct cash from the book values of debt plus equity. This cash-adjusted debt plus equity investment is in effect net operating assets (NOA), which is operating assets less operating liabilities (average of current and lagged values). If scale efficiencies exist, all four components of CR-COGS, SG&A, D&A, and NOA-should decline as scale increases.
We consider three measures of PM described in Table 1 . EBIT represents the sum of operating and non-operating income, NI represents GAAP income, which deducts all costs from revenue except the cost of equity. EI represents economic income, which deducts from NI a charge for the cost of equity. For our measure of EI, we assume the cost of equity equals the 10-year riskfree rate plus an equity premium of 3 percent. The charge for cost of equity equals equity book value (average of current and lagged values) times this imputed cost of equity (computed only for 13 Untabulated results confirm that Tax expense/Sales does not decline with AGE for our IPO sample. positive book equity). Note that Gross Margin and EBITDA, two other profit measures, can be inferred from COGS and the sum of COGS and SG&A, respectively. Whereas we use NOA as an indirect measure of financing costs, our profit measures are based on more direct estimates of the costs of debt and equity. Specifically, NI deducts interest expense, and EI also incorporates a charge for the cost of equity. We could multiply NOA by WACC (weighted average cost of debt and equity) to obtain a direct estimate of financing costs.
We elected not to do so, to offer an alternative-albeit more approximate-measure of financing costs that is not affected by error in our measures of the costs of debt and equity. In effect, scale efficiencies associated with financing costs can arise from two sources: lower base and lower rates.
NOA describes efficiencies from the first source, which allow larger firms to generate more sales per dollar of debt plus equity investment. NI and EI also incorporate efficiencies from the second source, if interest rates decline with scale. Given that we assume the same cost of equity in each cross-section, we ignore any efficiencies due to the cost of equity declining with scale.
Methodology and sample
Methodology
We track firms as they grow over time after the IPO and observe the extent to which measures of CR decline and measures of PM increase. We do not regress CR and PM on scale, however, because scale is endogenous. Unexpected changes in demand affect scale and also affect profitability, the dependent variable. Consider, for example, the introduction of a new product that turns out to be a hit. This event, which raises current and future profitability, will be positively related to current and future sales growth for that product. And to the extent that firms are financially constrained, the increased operating cash flows generated by this product will be available to fund additional growth. To mitigate against a mechanical relation between growth and scale efficiencies, we use firm age (AGE) as an instrument for scale. Firm age is exogenous, and is a reasonable ex ante proxy for scale, provided firms grow on average post IPO. 14 That is, scale efficiencies exist if the coefficient on AGE is negative (positive) in regressions of CR (PM) on AGE. We use year fixed effects to control for economy-wide variation in profitability over time, and firm fixed effects to control for across-firmvariation in the relative levels of different cost lines and profit margins. Firm fixed effects are particularly important here because we note that more recent IPO cohorts are associated with increasingly higher levels of SG&A and lower levels of COGS. Given that the fraction of older cohorts included in different AGE bins increases with AGE, COGS (SG&A) will exhibit a spurious positive (negative) relation with AGE in the absence of firm fixed effects.
We believe that age since IPO is more relevant here than age since incorporation. We have in mind that firms consider going public during periods of rapid growth, but there is variation in the number of years that pass after incorporation before firms enter that growth phase. By using AGE since IPO (AGE_IPO), we realign firms so their growth phases coincide. For our supplementary analyses on other samples for which the IPO date is not available, we use either a proxy-the number of years the firm is included on CRSP (AGE_CRSP) for the CRSP/Compustat sample-or the number of years since incorporation (AGE_INC) for the FACTSET and AMADEUS samples.
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Levels of different costs lines vary across firms and magnitudes of cost reductions achieved due to scale efficiencies are likely related to those levels. For example, reductions in COGS will 14 We confirm that our sample firms grow substantially as they age. The median real growth in Sales is over 8 percent, and the median Sales for post-IPO years is about 190 percent of sales in the IPO year (median AGE is 6 years). 15 We also confirm that the inferences from our main results, in Table 5 Panel A, remain unchanged when we use AGE_INC instead of AGE_IPO. The coefficients and t-stats are all closer to zero, relative to our main results. For additional details of AGE_INC for the IPO sample, see https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2015/08/ Founding-dates-for-10266-firms-going-public-in-the- US-during-1975 US-during- -2015 US-during- -2015 be more evident for firms with higher levels of COGS. Regardless, we expect to see average declines for all cost lines. Both issues-across-firm heterogeneity and small magnitudes of cost reductions-are less relevant for PM measures. Cross-sectional variation in levels of different cost lines should offset each other and scale efficiencies should be more apparent because they accumulate scale efficiencies generated in all the cost lines included in that measure. For example, across-firm differences in levels of COGS and SG&A should largely offset when their sum is subtracted from Sales to get EBIT, and EBIT should reflect the combined scale efficiencies in COGS and SG&A. We begin with all firm-year observations between 1950 and 2016 from the Compustat/CRSP merged universe. We remove from this sample firms in industries that relate to financial services and utilities, as well as observations with missing variables of interest, and firms with assets or annual sales less than $10 million in 2014 dollars. 16 We delete financial firms because their cost structure differs substantially from that of non-financial firms, and we delete utilities because they are subject to regulation that restricts them to earn "normal" profits. The resulting sample of 152, 036 firm-years represents our CRSP/Compustat sample, which went public at different points in time. Merging this intermediate sample with IPO data from Professor Jay Ritter's web site excludes IPOs that occurred before 1975.
Samples
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The resulting Ritter IPO sample yields 6,103 distinct firms, which correspond to 53,079 firm-years between 1975 and 2016. Table 3 describes the distribution of observations across industry membership for different AGE_IPO buckets. We use narrow two-year windows for the first 12 years, and then progressively 16 For purposes of comparison, this filter corresponds to $1 million in 1950 dollars. 17 We obtain IPO and incorporation dates from. https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ increase the time span covered in each bin thereafter to offset the decline in annual sample sizes with AGE. (The first AGE bucket includes all firm-years with fiscal year-ends within two years of the IPO date, and so on.) Industry membership refers to seven broad sectors as defined by the GICS classification. This Table suggests We repeat the analyses conducted on the IPO sample on three other samples, which are associated with lower growth. The first is the CRSP/Compustat sample mentioned in Table 2 , which adds firms that went public before 1975 to the IPO sample. Second, we supplement the results obtained for public US firms by including non-US public companies from FACTSET. This database provides financial information and date of incorporation for both US and non-US firms from around the world. We delete financial services firms (1-digit SSIC=6); firm-years with missing profit margin information and with sales less than $10 million (adjusted for inflation and exchange rates to 2014 U.S. dollars); and countries with fewer than 1,000 firm-years with available data. This sample contains 366,355 observations spanning 1990 to 2014. Median EBIT is about 6 percent of sales, and the difference between EBIT and pre-tax operating items (median of about 7 percent mentioned above) reflects non-operating items. Median NI, which deducts all costs including taxes but not the cost of equity, is about 3 percent of sales.
Deducting a cost of equity, equal to the 10-year Treasury bond yield plus a risk premium of 3 percent, leaves a small negative median EI. Median AGE_IPO, reported in the bottom row, is just over 6 years. Table 4 , Panel A. These plots allow us to identify potential variation across sectors (e.g., scale efficiencies are observed in some but not all industries) and non-linearities as AGE varies (e.g., scale efficiencies are higher for young firms, soon after IPO, but decline as firms mature). Under scale efficiencies, the changes for CR (PM) should lie below (above) zero. In general, there is little systematic evidence in Figure   1 of scale efficiencies, with two exceptions. First, unlike the other cost measures which suggest performance declines with AGE, changes in median SG&A appear to be generally negative for Health care, Energy, and Information Technology. Second, Health care consistently exhibits negative median changes for cost measures and positive median changes for profit measures, especially when AGE is low.
Scale efficiencies
We turn from investigating changes in cost and profit measures to regressing levels of those measures on AGE. If growth generates efficiencies, we expect negative (positive) coefficient estimates on AGE for CR (PM) measures. Our results are reported in Table 5 The results in Panel A of Table 5 confirm the preliminary findings reported in Figure 1: there is little evidence of scale efficiencies. None of the coefficients on cost ratios are significantly negative, and none of the coefficients on profit margins are significantly positive. In fact, the "wrong" sign is observed for all but one (NOA) of the coefficients, and the coefficients on COGS and EBIT are significant. The overall inference is that profitability declines slightly as firms grow.
In addition to being insignificant, recall that the coefficient on NOA only partly reflects financing costs: it includes the investment base but not the required rate of return. The two PM measures, NI and EI, incorporate financing costs more comprehensively as they account for both the base and the required rate. Estimates for the constant in each specification (not reported), which reflects average firm fixed effects, are consistent with the corresponding means reported in Table 4 Untabulated results confirm that inferences remain unchanged when we replace the year fixed effects in Panel A with industry-year fixed effects, where industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC level. Again, the coefficients are all of the wrong sign, except for NOA. This result strengthens our inference as it tightens identification: it reduces the likelihood that our inability to document performance improvement with AGE is due to industry-wide declines in performance.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis of no change in CR and PM with AGE does not imply that the alternative hypothesis should be rejected (e.g., Cready et al. 2019). Estimating confidence intervals around coefficient estimates provides the range of alternative hypotheses that also remain in consideration. Note that the alternative hypothesis, based on the existence of scale efficiencies, is one-sided: the slope on AGE for CR (PM) should be negative (positive). That is, the confidence intervals around the slope estimate should also be one-sided and the -levels should be twice as high, relative to two-sided intervals (e.g., Cohen et al. 2003) . Untabulated results indicate that the 95 percent confidence intervals around estimates in Table 5 , Panel A for COGS and EBIT are well above and below 0, respectively. That is, the alternative hypothesis that the IPO sample is associated with scale efficiencies is rejected at the five percent level for those two key measures.
For the remaining CR and PM measures, even though we are unable to reject that alternative hypothesis, the edge of the confidence interval in most cases barely crosses zero. For example, it is 0.067 percent for SG&A and 0.043 percent for NI (both expressed as percent of sales). That is, even if scale efficiencies exist, their magnitudes are small, at best. Accordingly, we focus on trends for the coefficients, and deemphasize the reported levels and associated statistical significance.
Allowing for nonlinear variation over time in
The coefficient for COGS increases over the first five AGE bins, before settling at a level that is above the level in the first bin by about 2 percent of sales. This pattern suggests that COGS increases for the first few years after the IPO, which is inconsistent with scale efficiencies. For SG&A, levels decline in the second and third bin-to about 2 percent of sales below that in the first bin-before increasing over time thereafter. This suggest some SG&A scale efficiencies soon after the IPO, which are lost over time. D&A does not exhibit any consistent pattern, whereas NOA rises sharply for the second AGE bin, and then declines thereafter, which is consistent with scale efficiencies. The patterns for the PM measures, which reflect the combined effects of different CR measures, suggest that an initial decline in PM for AGE 2_4 followed by an increase over the next two AGE bins, followed by a steady decline thereafter.
The main conclusion from our IPO sample is that there is no indication of scale efficiencies at the aggregate level (Table 5 , Panel A). There is evidence of scale efficiencies in pockets, however: margins improve with scale for one of seven sectors (Health Care in Figure 1 ), and declines in SG&A, though that pattern is only observed between years 4 and 8 after the IPO (Table   5 , Panel B) and some industries (Figure 1, Panel B) .
Could scale efficiencies exist, but be partially offset by other effects?
While the results so far suggest that scale efficiencies do not naturally arise for US firms after their IPO, there are potential alternative explanations. In particular, it is possible that scale efficiencies arise naturally but they are offset by other effects, leaving little evidence in reported numbers. The four offsetting effects we investigate are: competition, resource constraints, agency costs, and demand uncertainty. We describe below the offsetting effects and the proxies used to capture those effects. a) Competition. If competitors are also able to gain scale efficiencies, output prices will fall and any scale efficiencies are passed along to consumers. We measure competition using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) computed at the 3-digit SIC industry level. Note that HHI is inversely related to competition: Low HHI means competition is high. b) Resource availability. Firms might face constraints on various resources-such as capital and managerial talent-that limit their ability to take on all profitable opportunities as they arise. If so, firms should take the most profitable ones first and walk down the available investment opportunity set over time. The resulting pattern of declining margins as firms grow over time will offset the increasing margins associated with scale efficiencies. We measure resource availability, which is inversely related to resource constraints, as the ratio of cash plus short-term investments to total assets, computed at the firm level (Denis and McKeon, 201) . c) Agency costs. Managers of firms, facing incentives that are not fully consistent with shareholder interests, might engage in actions that destroy value created by scale efficiencies, and this tendency might increase with age. We measure agency costs using the ratio of total assets to sales, computed at the firm level (Ang et al. 2000) . Admittedly, this variable could proxy for many other effects, but our search of the literature did not suggest other agency cost proxies that are available for most of our sample. 18 d) Demand uncertainty. Banker et al. (2014) find that firms facing high demand uncertainty select high fixed cost strategies to be able to fill demand when it is high. High fixed cost structures should 18 For example, we could generate agency cost measures that reflect corporate governance, based on characteristics of boards and executives, derived from ISS and Execucomp data. We expect a substantial decline in sample size, however, given the limited coverage of these data sources, both across firms and over time.
be associated with higher scale efficiencies. We measure demand uncertainty as the change in log Sales, computed at the firm level.
Our research approach is to exploit cross-sectional variation in these offsetting effects.
While the effects might offset scale efficiencies on average, that offset should be smaller in subsamples that are impacted less by each effect. If, for example, competition offsets the margin improvements from scale efficiencies, we should still observe margin improvements for the subgroup associated with less competition. We partition our IPO sample at the median each year along the four factors that proxy for these offsetting effects. We then assign firms into Hi and Lo groups for each factor based on whether the firm was more often above or below the median. 19 We repeat the analysis conducted for the full sample (Panel A of Table 5 ) for each effect, after adding interactions between AGE and the Hi or Lo indicator variable to allow for separate slopes and intercepts for the two groups. The interaction with Hi/Lo is selected so that the slope on AGE_IPO reflects the less affected group, which is the one expected to exhibit scale efficiencies.
The subgroup expected to be less affected by the offset is Hi for HHI (low competition), Hi for resource availability, Lo for agency costs, and Hi for demand uncertainty. Under the alternative explanation, we expect the slope on AGE_IPO to be negative (positive) for CR (PM) if less affected firms exhibit scale efficiencies. And we expected the slope on the interaction terms to be positive (negative) for CR (PM) to reflect the weaker scale efficiencies for the subgroup that is more affected by the offset. Table 5 , Panel C, provides the results from this investigation. Contrary to the alternative explanation, the slopes on AGE_IPO are generally positive for the CR measures (NOA is again the lone measure that is associated with negative but insignificant slopes), and the slopes are all 19 We observe similar results when we repeat the analysis based on Hi/Lo partitions determined at the firm-year level, rather than the firm level.
negative for the PM measures. That is, we find cost ratio increases and profit margin declines, as IPO firms grow, for all four groups expected to exhibit scale efficiencies. The slopes on the interaction terms provide mixed evidence: they are generally in the direction predicted by the alternative explanation for two of the factors-resource availability and demand uncertainty-but go in the opposite direction for the other two factors. We sum the slopes on AGE_IPO and interaction terms to estimate the relation with AGE for the group expected to face a greater offset (less likely to exhibit scale efficiencies). We confirm that these slopes are again of the same sign as the other group for all four factors. Failure to find evidence of scale efficiencies for any of the eight groups suggested by the alternative explanation is consistent with our main inference so far: scale efficiencies do not appear to arise naturally as IPO firms grow.
Robustness analyses: replication on other samples
This section provides the results of analyses conducted to confirm the robustness of our inference from Section 4 regarding the absence of systematic scale efficiencies for the IPO sample.
We repeat the analysis of trends in cost and profit measures for three other samples: a) the CRSP/Compustat sample, which adds to the IPO sample US firms that went public before 1975; b) the FACTSET global sample, which contains publicly-traded US and non-US firms; and c) the AMADEUS sample, which contains private European firms. All three samples are much larger than our IPO sample, but they are associated with lower growth prospects. The latter two data sources provide fewer measures of performance but many more observations. Because age since IPO is not available for all three samples, it is measured as the number of years the firm is included on CRSP (IPO_CRSP) for the CRSP/Compustat sample, and as the number of years since incorporation (IPO_INC) for the latter two samples.
CRSP/Compustat sample
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 , Panel B, for the CRSP/Compustat sample, indicate levels of COGS and SG&A that are about 7 percent higher and 8 percent lower, respectively, relative to the IPO sample (described in Panel A). Both differences are due to a secular decline (increase) over time in COGS (SG&A), which appears to be due mainly to changes over time in the type of firms that are publicly-traded in the US. These differences between the two samples for COGS and SG&A approximately cancel each other, as the remaining rows in Panel B resemble those for the IPO sample in Panel A.
The results in Table 6 repeat the analyses in Panels A and B of Table 5 Table 5 . The coefficient on COGS is similar (small positive but significant) and exhibits the same inverted U shape. The coefficient on SG&A is always insignificant, and the coefficients on two of the profit measures-EBIT and NI-are significantly negative. The CRSP sample results are also inconsistent with scale efficiency.
Observing small and often insignificant coefficients on AGE for this sample of US public firms suggests a role for a simple model to forecast future levels of costs and profits: assume that the levels (which are deflated by sales) follow a random walk with no drift. To get a sense of the accuracy of those predictions we compute forecast errors for levels of the different cost ratios and The overall picture that emerges from Figure 2 is that while profit margins are harder to predict, cost ratios are remarkably "sticky" and reasonably well predicted by last year's values.
This finding suggests a simple approach to calibrate projections of future income statements. A "proportional" model, where different cost lines maintain a constant proportion of sales, is a reasonable first approximation. Our results (not tabulated) provide less support for a popular approach that projects past CAGR (compounded annual growth rates) for each line item into the future.
Other samples
Panels A and B of Table 7 contain the results of estimating regressions of profit measures on AGE for the AMADEUS and FACTSET samples, respectively. We are unable to obtain data on our cost measures for both samples, but are able to investigate the behavior of profit margins.
Unlike our results so far, which indicate insignificant coefficient estimates on AGE, for these two samples the coefficients are all negative, and significant for all profit measures except NI. Similar to the results for our CRSP sample, we see no evidence of scale efficiencies for private European firms and public firms around the globe.
Although we are unable to obtain data for our cost measures for these two samples, we locate variables that are related to NOA. AMADEUS provides Net Asset Margin (= Shareholders' equity + long-term liabilities, scaled by sales), and FACTSET provides Asset Margin (= Sales/Total Assets). Untabulated results indicate a negative coefficient on AGE for Net Asset Margin, consistent with scale efficiencies, but inconsistent with the profit measure results in Table 7 , Panel A. The coefficient for Asset Margin is significantly negative, consistent with the negative scale efficiencies observed for the profit measure results in Table 7 , Panel B.
Estimating these regressions within countries for the two samples produces results consistent with the inferences from the full-sample results reported in Table 7 . For the AMADEUS sample, most of the coefficients for profit measures are negative and 11 of the 12 significant estimates are negative. For the FACTSET sample, most of the coefficients for profit measures are again negative and 26 of the 34 significant estimates are negative.
Our inability to document scale efficiencies for the three samples discussed in this section suggests that the results based on our IPO sample are not an aberration. We are surprised that none of the samples provide empirical support for a notion that is so widely invoked in practice.
Concluding thoughts
It is common for business analyses and projections to assume that different cost lines (expressed as a fraction of sales) decline, and profit margins improve, as firms grow. Numerous justifications-such as operating leverage, increased bargaining power, and network effects-are used to support these projected performance improvements associated with scale. Even though scale efficiencies are widely expected to arise naturally with growth, empirical evidence is scant.
While there are vast literatures that investigate cost behavior, the contexts examined differ from the projections commonly conducted for business purposes. As a result, prior evidence and conclusions may not carry over to this context. For example, the measures studied in prior research relate to units rather than dollars of output, investigations are conducted at the plant level rather than the firm level, and scale variation is cross-sectional rather than over time.
We seek to document the magnitude of scale efficiencies by examining trends over time for a sample of US firms after their IPO. Given that these firms grow substantially after they go public, we expect substantial scale efficiencies in the form of declines in costs/sales ratios and increases in margins. However, our results suggest that scale efficiencies are hard to find: costs/sales ratios increase slightly and profit margins decline as these firms grow post IPO.
Investigation of other samples and costs suggests that this result is robust.
The most direct interpretation of our results is that they reflect the underlying nature of how costs evolve as firms grow; i.e., margins do not on average improve with growth.
Nevertheless, our evidence is also consistent with an alternative explanation: scale efficiencies exist and increase margins, but they are offset by other effects that reduce margins. We consider four such effects-competition, resource constraints, agency costs, and demand uncertainty-but again find no evidence consistent with such offsetting effects.
Our results are surprising, to us and to others, because the notion that scale efficiencies exist is so widely accepted. We are also surprised that scale efficiencies are incorporated so routinely in projections, apparently based on intuition without empirical support.
Regardless of why our results are observed, the empirical regularity we document has important implications. First, projections that routinely anticipate declining average costs are likely optimistic. Any scale efficiencies projected deserve careful scrutiny to confirm that they are reasonable and supported by experience. Second, if average costs/sales are close to long-run marginal costs/sales, there should be fewer concerns about distortions caused by firms using average costs as a proxy for relevant marginal costs. Finally, projections of future income statements could rely on historic ratios of costs/sales and margins as a first approximation because they are reasonably close to observed values of the corresponding ratios. Prior research (e.g., LaPorta 1996 and Dechow et al. 2000) suggests that investors do not fully adjust for optimism in analysts' long-term earnings forecasts. We do not examine whether this result is due to investors overestimating future sales or underestimating future costs (scale efficiencies). Variable Definitions. 
